The Four Dimensions of an Intellectual Virtue by Baehr, Jason
Digital Commons@
Loyola Marymount University
and Loyola Law School
Philosophy Faculty Works Philosophy
1-1-2016
The Four Dimensions of an Intellectual Virtue
Jason Baehr
Loyola Marymount University, jbaehr@lmu.edu
This Article - pre-print is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola
Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Repository Citation
Baehr, Jason, "The Four Dimensions of an Intellectual Virtue" (2016). Philosophy Faculty Works. 16.
http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/phil_fac/16
Recommended Citation
Baehr, Jason. “The Four Dimensions of an Intellectual Virtue.” Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy. Eds.
Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote, and Ernest Sosa New York: Routledge, 2015. 86-98. Print.
 1 
The following is a penultimate draft. For the final draft, please see the volume in which it 
appears.  
 
The Four Dimensions of an Intellectual Virtue 
Jason Baehr 
Loyola Marymount University 
 
One aim of virtue theory in ethics and epistemology is to deepen our understanding 
of what virtues are—of what makes them virtues, of their internal structure, of how their 
various constitutive elements are related to each other, and so on.1 The present chapter is 
aimed at addressing one question in this vicinity: namely, what are the primary dimensions 
of an intellectual virtue? As such it is intended as a contribution to what I have elsewhere 
called “autonomous virtue epistemology,” which involves philosophical reflection on 
intellectual virtues and their role in the cognitive life considered apart from more 
traditional questions in epistemology (e.g. questions about the nature and limits of 
knowledge).2 I argue that intellectual virtues have four main dimensions: a motivational 
dimension, an affective dimension, a competence dimension, and a judgment dimension.3 
At the end of the chapter, I deploy this four-dimensional model to address a problem that 
has recently arisen within virtue epistemology concerning intellectual virtue, reliability, 
and luck. Given the broad scope of the chapter, the discussion will proceed at a fairly 
general level. However, my hope is that, partly on account of this generality, it will provide 
a kind of framework for identifying and organizing further issues and questions that might 
be pursued by philosophers with an interest in intellectual virtues.  
 
1. Preliminaries 
 
I begin with a few preliminary points. First, I am thinking of intellectual virtues 
along “responsibilist” lines, that is, as good intellectual character traits like curiosity, 
attentiveness, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, intellectual humility, intellectual 
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carefulness, and so on. As such they are distinct from but involve the use of “faculty virtues” 
like memory, vision, and introspection.4 While structurally similar to moral virtues, they 
are also distinct from what we ordinarily think of as moral virtues on account of aiming at 
distinctively epistemic goods like truth, knowledge, and understanding.5  
Second, while I take the account sketched here to cover the central dimensions of an 
intellectual virtue, I do not claim to be specifying sufficient conditions for an intellectual 
virtue. Nor am I committed to claiming that the dimensions in question are strictly 
necessary. There may, for instance, be a subset of intellectual virtues the members of which 
lack one or more of the dimensions identified here.6 Rather, I am thinking of the account as 
a theoretical model that covers enough of the relevant cases to be explanatorily 
illuminating and useful. 
Third, I am conceiving of intellectual virtues as “personal excellences,” that is, as 
qualities that make their possessor good or admirable qua person. As I have argued 
elsewhere (Baehr 2011: Chs. 6-7), we often admire persons who are inquisitive, thoughtful, 
intellectually careful, thorough, honest, and open-minded. These virtues bear, not just on 
their likely success at reaching the truth or achieving knowledge, but also on who they are 
as persons. They say something important and favorable about some of their fundamental 
cares and concerns. My focus, then, is the structure of intellectual virtues understood as 
traits that contribute to personal worth or excellence.   
 
2. Motivational Dimension 
 
The first dimension of an intellectual virtue is a motivational one. It is featured 
prominently in many extant accounts of intellectual virtue. Indeed, a cursory look at some 
of the literature in virtue epistemology might lead one to think that there is little more to 
being an intellectually virtuous person than “loving” or desiring truth and related epistemic 
goods. Linda Zagzebski, for instance, claims that intellectual virtues “are all forms of the 
motivation to have cognitive contact with reality” (1996: 167). Similarly, James 
Montmarquet describes intellectual virtues as the “qualities that a truth-desiring person … 
would want to have” (1993: 30). And Bob Roberts and Jay Wood argue that a “love of 
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knowledge” is a “presupposition or necessary background of all the other intellectual 
virtues” (2007: 305).  
 These claims are plausible. I propose the following related principle: 
 
Motivational Principle (MP): A subject S possesses an intellectual virtue V only if S’s 
possession of V is rooted in a “love” of epistemic goods.7 
 
Accordingly, if a person is motivated to think or inquire in ways that are careful, thorough, 
and rigorous, but does so only to impress her peers or to avoid losing her job, then her 
carefulness, thoroughness, and rigor will not be fully virtuous in the relevant sense. I 
hasten to add that I intend a broad construal of both “love” and “epistemic goods.” The 
former can but need not include a desire for epistemic goods. It might also include a firm 
rational or volitional commitment to truth—a commitment that kicks in when the desire for 
truth wanes. By “epistemic goods” I mean ends like knowledge, truth, and understanding. 
However, to the extent that there exist other worthy epistemic ends, they are relevant here 
as well. Also, the goods in question can be understood in general or specific terms: e.g. as 
knowledge or understanding in a fairly broad or generic sense or as knowledge or 
understanding of some very specific matter.  
It is intuitively plausible to think of intellectual virtues as character traits that are 
rooted in or flow from a “love” of epistemic goods. But there are other reasons to accept MP 
as well. First, as suggested above, MP provides a way of distinguishing between intellectual 
virtues and what we ordinarily think of as moral virtues. It allows us to say, plausibly, that 
what unifies the class of intellectual virtues and distinguishes them from other virtue-types 
is that they aim at distinctively epistemic ends. Moral virtues, by contrast, tend to be 
oriented toward distinctively moral ends like justice, pleasure, and the alleviation of 
suffering.8  
 Second, thinking of intellectual virtues as involving a “love” of epistemic goods also 
provides an explanation of why we often think of intellectual virtues as admirable personal 
qualities or “personal excellences.” To see why, it will be helpful to briefly consider two 
recent accounts of moral virtue. In Virtue, Vice, and Value (2001), Tom Hurka defends the 
view that virtues are instances of “loving” (desiring, pursuing, taking pleasure in) one or 
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more “baseline” goods like pleasure, achievement, and knowledge. In A Theory of Virtue 
(2006), Robert Adams argues that virtue is a matter of persisting excellence in “being for” 
(loving, liking, wanting, respecting, appreciating) the good. Moreover, both Hurka and 
Adams characterize the sort of orientation in question as having a kind of intrinsic value 
akin to the notion of personal worth or excellence described above—a value over and 
above the value of any moral effects or consequences that are likely to follow from this 
orientation. In explaining the evaluative basis of virtue, Hurka invokes the following 
principle: “If x is intrinsically good, then loving x (desiring, pursuing, or taking pleasure in 
x) for itself is also intrinsically good” (Hurka 2001: 13). The first-order intrinsic goods 
Hurka has in mind are the baseline goods like pleasure and achievement; and the second-
order intrinsic value is the type of value instantiated by virtues on his view. According to 
Adams, “[to] say that virtue must be excellent is not just to say that it must be good … 
Excellence is the objective and non-instrumental goodness of that which is worthy to be 
honored, loved, admired, and (in the extreme case) worshipped, for its own sake” (Adams 
2006: 24). The overall picture here is one according to virtues involve being properly 
oriented toward certain good or worthy ends—an orientation that is intrinsically valuable 
or admirable. If this is right, then a motivational dimension of intellectual virtues of the sort 
described by MP is capable of explaining the sense in which intellectual virtues are 
personally admirable, for this dimension involves “loving” or “being for” epistemic goods.  
 
3. Affective Dimension 
 
Consider a person with a wide range of intellectual interests who regularly follows 
up on these interests by reading about and reflecting on the various topics in question. 
While she perseveres in her attempts to acquire knowledge and understanding in the 
relevant areas, her enjoyment of the learning process doesn’t match her initial intellectual 
enthusiasm. In fact she often finds rather dull or even resents the kind of intellectual effort 
and activity required by this process. Compare this person with an exact counterpart minus 
the lack of enjoyment just noted. The counterpart has the same intellectual interests and 
engages in the same intellectual activity in the pursuit of these interests, but instead is 
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often invigorated by and takes delight in the learning process: she enjoys asking questions, 
attending to important details, solving puzzles, and probing for deeper understanding. 
Plausibly, the second person is more intellectually virtuous than the first. This points in the 
direction of a second, affective dimension of intellectual virtue.  
Aristotle gets at this dimension at various points in the Nicomachean Ethics when 
discussing the relationship between pleasure and virtue. One of his key points is that a 
person can do the right or virtuous thing—even do so because it is right—while still falling 
short of virtue, even in that performance. The problem is that the person might do the right 
thing without the proper feelings or affections, in particular, without taking any pleasure in 
the action. He remarks: 
 
[T]he person who does not enjoy noble actions is not good. For no one would call a 
person just if he did not enjoy acting justly, or generous if he did not enjoy generous 
actions; and the same goes for the other virtues. If this is so, it follows that actions in 
accordance with virtue are pleasant in themselves. (1099a)  
 
While Aristotle’s primary concern in this passage is moral activity and virtue, he makes a 
similar point in connection with contemplative activity in Book X:  
 
Pleasure completes the activity not as the inherent state does, but as a sort of 
supervenient end, like the bloom on the faces of young men. So long, then, as the 
objects of intellect or perception, and the faculties of judgement or contemplation, 
are as they should be, there will be pleasure in the activity. (NE, 1175a) 
 
There is considerable plausibility in Aristotle’s views here. They support the 
following principle:  
 
Affective Principle (AP): S possesses an intellectual virtue V only if S takes pleasure 
in (or experiences other appropriate affections in relation to) the activity 
characteristic of V.  
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Two points of clarification are in order. First, while the primary focus of AP is pleasure, 
pleasure is not the only affective state that might be required by intellectual virtue. Indeed, 
as suggested by virtue ethical discussions of regret (e.g. Hursthouse 1999), there may be 
times when an intellectually virtuous inquirer will feel regret or be pained by an action that 
nevertheless is consistent with or even required by intellectual virtue. For instance, a 
person might, out of intellectual humility, feel compelled to recognize and acknowledge a 
particular intellectual mistake he has made. If the mistake is egregious enough or if the 
stakes surrounding the mistake are sufficiently high, we might expect the person, if he is 
truly intellectually humble, to be pained by or to feel regret about his error. Hence the 
parenthetical clause in MP about “other appropriate affections.”9 A second and related 
point is that AP should not be read as saying that every instance of intellectually virtuous 
activity must be accompanied by a particular affective state (whether pleasure, pain, or 
otherwise). As Aristotle observes in connection with courage, virtuous activity sometimes 
requires, not pleasure, but rather a mere absence of pain or other unvirtuous affective state 
(NE 1104b). Similarly, in certain contexts, the demands of a virtue like intellectual tenacity 
may be exceedingly tedious. While we would not expect an intellectually virtuous agent to 
take delight in such activity, we might expect her not to be pained by it. These exceptions 
notwithstanding, it remains plausible that on the whole, a fully intellectually virtuous 
person will as such derive pleasure from virtuous intellectual activity. 
 It is worth considering in a little more detail the relationship between the 
motivational and affective dimensions of an intellectual virtue. It might be thought that if a 
person really has a robust “love” of epistemic goods, then he will necessarily already have 
the sorts of affections required by AP, thereby rendering AP redundant. But this is mistaken 
on two counts. First, as noted above, MP can be satisfied by a purely volitional commitment 
to epistemic goods. While such a commitment would still reflect favorably on its possessor 
qua person, it would not guarantee a proper affective response. A person might, for 
instance, be firmly committed to acting in accordance with her epistemic duty or to 
pursuing knowledge of a particular subject matter while nevertheless doing so 
begrudgingly, thereby indicating a deficiency of intellectual virtue. Second, as I am thinking 
of it, the love of epistemic goods described in MP pertains more to the onset or inception of 
inquiry than it does to the entire process of seeking after the truth. As the example above is 
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intended to illustrate, even a sincere and robust desire for epistemic goods does not 
guarantee proper enjoyment of the intellectual activity that must be undertaken to fulfill 
this desire. For these reasons, we should view the motivational and affective components of 
an intellectual virtue as closely related but distinct. 
 We have examined the motivational and affective dimensions of an intellectual 
virtue. However, the account as developed thus far is incomplete in two important respects. 
To get at why, it will be useful to return to Adams’s (2006) account of virtue, according to 
which virtue is “excellence in being for the good.” The notion of excellence plays a critical 
role in Adams’s account. It is intended to account for the fact that one can be for the good in 
ways that are entirely serious and robust but that nevertheless are inconsistent with virtue. 
Specifically, one can be for the good either incompetently or foolishly. If I desire to get to the 
truth but am incompetent at asking good questions, assessing evidence, taking up 
alternative points of view, and so on, then, all my good epistemic will notwithstanding, my 
claim to intellectual virtue will be weak indeed. Similarly, if I am both motivated and 
competent at taking up alternative points of view, but consistently do so at the wrong time, 
toward the wrong views, in the wrong situations, and so on, then here as well I will fall 
short of genuine virtue. This points in the direction of two additional dimensions of an 
intellectual virtue.  
 
4. Competence Dimension 
 
Elsewhere I have argued (2011: Ch. 6) that for each intellectual virtue, we can 
identify a form of cognitive activity that is specific to or characteristic of that virtue (see 
also Zagzebski 1996). So, for instance, open-mindedness involves setting aside a default 
cognitive standpoint in order to take up an alternative one, attentiveness involves noticing 
and attending to important details, curiosity involves asking thoughtful and insightful 
questions, and so on. This point, together with the observation that a person can be “for” 
epistemic goods while nevertheless being incompetent at pursuing or handling them, 
suggests the following further principle:  
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Competence Principle (CP): S possesses an intellectual virtue V only if S is 
competent at the activity characteristic of V.  
 
One mark in favor of CP is that it provides a plausible basis for individuating one 
intellectual virtue from another. On the present model, an open-minded person is 
importantly similar to an attentive person, a curious person, and anyone else in the 
possession of an intellectual virtue. For, again, all such persons are motivated by a positive 
orientation toward epistemic goods. How, then, are we to differentiate the virtues in 
question? One plausible response is to say that an open-minded person is competent or 
skilled at one type of virtue-relevant activity, while an intellectually attentive person is 
skilled at a different type of activity, and the curious person at yet a different type. This is 
precisely what is required by CP.   
CP also explains why habituation has typically been thought to play an important 
role in the acquisition of virtues. It is widely believed that moral virtues are developed at 
least partly via the practice or repetition of certain virtue-relevant actions—practice that 
eventually leads to the formation of settled dispositions or habits. This is no less plausible 
in the case of intellectual character virtues. If CP is true, this is precisely what we should 
expect, for the activities picked out by this principle are ones that can be deliberately 
practiced and improved upon with time. One can practice taking up alternative standpoints 
or noticing and focusing on important details. One can even practice curiosity by 
deliberately attempting to identify and formulate thoughtful and insightful questions. Thus 
CP fits well with a habituation model of virtue formation.  
As these remarks suggest, CP is also capable of making sense of the putative 
connection between virtue, on the one hand, and competences and skills, on the other. 
Several authors in virtue epistemology and virtue ethics have defended the existence of 
such a connection. Ernest Sosa, for instance, has long argued for a competence model of 
intellectual virtues (1991: 138; 1997). And Julia Annas has argued that the possession of 
moral and intellectual virtues centrally involves the possession of certain skills (2013; 
2003: 16-23). These are plausible views. CP fits well with them by making the possession of 
a certain sort of cognitive competence or skill central to the possession of an intellectual 
virtue.  
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5. Judgment Dimension 
 
A fourth and final dimension of intellectual virtue is made evident by evident by 
some empirical research conducted at Project Zero, an education research institute at the 
Harvard Graduate School of Education. This research focuses on “thinking dispositions,” 
which are nearly identical to what we are calling intellectual virtues. One notable finding of 
Project Zero researchers David Perkins and Shari Tishman (2001) concerns what they refer 
to as “sensitivity,” which, roughly, is an awareness of which virtues should be deployed or 
exercised in a given situation. Specifically, they found that a surprising number of students 
have both the will and the ability to, for example, engaging in open-minded and creative 
ways of thinking but fail to do so because they lack good judgment about when such 
thinking is appropriate. Tishman summarizes their findings thus: 
 
Motivation is important, of course, and so are intellectual skills. But research reveals 
that sensitivity plays a much larger role in effective thinking than one might expect. 
Students often have quite a bit of difficulty perceiving opportunities to think 
critically and creatively when these opportunities are embedded in the everyday 
stream of life, even when they possess the skills and the will to do so. (Tishman 
2000: 46) 
 
This points to a further dimension of an intellectual virtue:  
 
Judgment Principle (JP): S possesses an intellectual virtue V only if S is disposed to 
recognize when (and to what extent, etc.) the activity characteristic of V would be 
epistemically appropriate.    
 
The students above fail to possess intellectual virtues because they fail to satisfy JP. Again, 
they fail to reliably identify the occasions on which they should deploy their cognitive 
abilities.  
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 In addition to the empirical research just noted, there are at least two further 
reasons in support of RP. The first is that RP provides an explanation of the putative 
connection between intellectual virtue and phronesis. According to Aristotle’s doctrine of 
the mean, virtue-possession involves acting or feeling in certain virtue-relevant ways at the 
right time, in the right amount, toward then right person, in the right way, and so on. This 
requires a certain kind of practical judgment supplied by phronesis. Specifically, for any 
form of virtue-relevant activity, the phronimos knows when, how much, toward whom, in 
what way, and so on, to engage in that activity. While Aristotle’s point here concerns moral 
virtues, it applies equally well to intellectual character virtues. To possess open-
mindedness, intellectual courage, or intellectual carefulness, one must be able to judge 
when, for how long, toward whom, and in what manner to engage in the activity 
characteristic of these virtues. This is precisely the sort of recognitional ability required by 
JP. This close connection between intellectual virtue and phronesis is gestured at by 
Roberts and Wood when they say, of intellectual virtues, that phronesis or practical wisdom 
“is involved in every virtue, as constituting the good judgment without which no human 
virtue could be exemplified … Insofar as virtues are human, they are infused with and 
qualified by reason, as the ancients would say; they are dispositions of intelligence” (2007: 
305). 
 A second advantage of JP is its ability to explain the sense in which intellectual 
virtues “flow” from or are “rooted” in a love of epistemic goods. As indicated above, this is a 
familiar and plausible way of thinking about intellectual virtues. But what exactly does it 
amount to? In what way or sense do intellectual virtues “flow” from a love of epistemic 
goods? To see how JP contains an answer to this question, consider an example of 
intellectual carefulness. Imagine a student working on a lengthy and challenging logical 
proof. Having arrived at an apparent solution, she decides to double-check her work 
because she knows that with a proof of this sort, mistakes can easily be made. Thus she 
manifests the recognitional ability described in JP. Now, suppose the student were asked 
why she has decided to double-check her work. Her initial reply might be: “Because I want 
to make sure I get the proof right.” But suppose she were pressed further about why this 
aim has led her to engage in this specific form of intellectual activity rather than some other 
form. She might respond, somewhat incredulously: “This is a lengthy and difficult proof. It’s 
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easy to make mistakes on a problem like this. I am double-checking my work to ensure that 
it doesn’t contain any errors.”  
 This example illustrates the point that certain sorts of beliefs are built into the 
structure of the recognitional ability described in JP, namely, beliefs to the effect that 
certain kinds of virtue-relevant activity (e.g. double-checking one’s work) are an effective 
way of pursuing or achieving one’s epistemic aims (e.g. correctly completing the proof). 
Again, when an intellectually virtuous agent makes a judgment about how to proceed in a 
given situation, he draws upon his beliefs about which sorts of activities will be most useful 
or relevant given both the particularities of the situation he is in together with his interest 
in getting to the truth, acquiring knowledge, or the like. Accordingly, such beliefs—and the 
judgmental capacity they partly constitute—play an important role in explaining why 
intellectually virtuous agents think and inquire in the ways they do.  
Elsewhere I have referred to the beliefs in question as “connecting beliefs” because 
of how, from the agent’s point of view, they connect the agent’s immediate focus or actions 
with her broader epistemic aims or goals. Of course, these beliefs need not be conscious or 
explicit. The agent may not even be aware of or have reflected on the fact that she has them. 
In fact, in the kind of case described above, it is important that the belief or beliefs in 
question not be occurrent, at least while the relevant activity is taking place. As she double-
checks her proof, the logic student will be focused exclusively on the steps of the proof 
itself—not on the fact that reviewing these steps will help secure a correct answer to the 
problem she is working on.  Nevertheless, again, if we reflect on why she engages in this 
virtue-relevant activity rather some other form of activity (e.g. turning in the proof without 
further review), a plausible answer is that she believes at some level that this activity is 
importantly related to her broader epistemic goal.  
 Suppose, then, that connecting beliefs are partly constitutive of the judgmental or 
recognitional ability required by JP. How does this shed light on the point that intellectual 
virtues are grounded in a love of epistemic goods? My suggestion is that intellectual virtues 
“flow” from or are “rooted” in a love of epistemic goods in the sense that an intellectually 
virtuous agent is disposed to engage in virtue-relevant activity because she believes that 
doing so will be helpful in her pursuit or handling of epistemic goods. Her intellectually 
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virtuous activity is a way of working out or expressing her love of epistemic goods—a way 
that is guided and explained the beliefs in question.  
 
6. Intellectual Virtues, Reliability, and Luck 
 
I have sketched a theoretical model or framework according to which intellectual 
virtues have four main dimensions: a motivational dimension, an affective dimension, a 
competence dimension, and a judgment dimension. As general as it is, the model sheds light 
on the broad structure of an intellectual virtue. In addition to furthering our understanding 
in this way, the model can prove useful in other ways. It can, for instance, give us a better 
sense of what additional questions and issues need to be addressed in order to arrive at an 
even deeper and more precise understanding of intellectual virtues.10  
It can also be useful in the context of “intellectual character education,” that is, in the 
process of trying to foster growth or progress in intellectual virtues in ourselves or in 
others (e.g. in an educational setting). By identifying the central dimensions of an 
intellectual virtue, it provides a clearer account of just where an educator’s focus and 
efforts need to be directed. It can also be useful in the attempt to understand how 
successful these educative efforts have been, that is, in trying to measure growth in 
intellectual virtues. Specifically, it suggests that instead of trying to do so in a holistic or 
singular manner (an intimidating an perplexing endeavor, to say the least), it might be 
more effective to measure intellectual character growth along the four specified 
dimensions, perhaps employing a different measure in connection with each dimension.  
Finally, the model may be useful for addressing certain issues or questions within 
virtue epistemology. To illustrate, in the remainder of this section I explain how the model 
provides at least a partial resolution to a problem concerning intellectual virtues, epistemic 
reliability, and epistemic luck.  
Within the virtue epistemology literature, two competing claims or intuitions about 
the reliability of intellectual virtues are regularly countenanced. According to the first, 
epistemic reliability is an essential—indeed even an uncontroversial—feature of 
intellectual virtues. The idea, roughly, is that a mere desire for truth or understanding, or 
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even the (mere) attempt to lay hold of such goods, is not sufficient for the possession of an 
intellectual virtue. Rather, to possess an intellectual virtue, one must, on account of the 
activity characteristic of the virtue, reliably form true beliefs.11 Call this this the reliability 
intuition.  
There is, of course, something quite compelling about the reliability intuition. 
However, it must be balanced against a second, also very plausible intuition. Consider an 
unwitting victim of a Cartesian demon who routinely engages in the sort of intellectual 
activity we take to be expressive of intellectual virtues. She cares deeply about acquiring 
knowledge and understanding about a wide range of topics. She asks thoughtful and 
insightful questions. She notices and attends to important details. She embraces intellectual 
challenge and struggle. She gives an honest and fair hearing to opposing views. And so on. 
Such a person has all the internal markers of intellectual virtue. However, these markers 
are wholly unreliable. Because of the systematic discrepancy between appearance and 
reality in the demon world, they fail to supply the person with a preponderance of true 
beliefs. As other authors have noted (e.g. Montmarquet 1993), it remains highly plausible 
to think of such a person as intellectually virtuous. Her failure to reach the truth is due 
entirely to bad epistemic luck. From her own point of view, and from that of everyone else 
in her world, her intellectual activity is reliable. While in reality it is not, this fact is entirely 
beyond her ken. Particularly if we are committed to thinking of intellectual virtues as 
personal excellences, the bad luck of the demon victim should not prevent her from 
possessing any intellectual virtues. Bad luck of the sort in question does not plausibly bear 
upon one’s goodness or badness qua person. Call this the luck intuition.  
Elsewhere (2011: Chs. 6 and 7; 2007) I have defended an internalist account of 
intellectual virtue according to which reliability is not a requirement for the possession of 
an intellectual virtue. I will not rehearse the relevant dialectic here. Rather, my aim at 
present is to show how the four-dimensional model of an intellectual virtue sketched above 
makes possible at least a partial reconciliation of the reliability and luck intuitions.  
Note, first, that CP goes at least some way toward making sense of the reliability 
intuition. According to this principle, a person possesses an intellectual virtue only if he is 
competent at the activity characteristic of the virtue in question. This rules out the 
possibility that a person might be intellectually virtuous while possessing a mere love of 
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epistemic goods or on account of mere attempts to get at the truth. It requires that 
intellectually virtuous agents be competent at the activities characteristic of the virtues 
they possess. Put another way, it requires that they reliably engage in certain virtue-
relevant activities—even if these activities don’t reliably result in the formation of true 
beliefs.12 Moreover, it seems entirely plausible to think that if a person is competent in the 
manner required by CP (and satisfies MP and JP), then provided that she is operating under 
reasonably favorable epistemic conditions (e.g. that she is not the victim of a Cartesian 
demon), she will be epistemically reliable. Thus the four-dimensional model can be viewed 
as entailing a kind of conditional reliability requirement—one that holds only in reasonably 
epistemically favorable circumstances.13  
The four-dimensional model also allows us to make sense of the luck intuition. For, 
it does not entail a strict or unconditional reliability requirement. A demon victim might 
possess a love of epistemic goods, be competent at asking good questions, probing for 
understanding, listening openly to competing views, and so on, and be a good judge of 
when (and to what extent, etc.) to engage in activities. As such, she might be intellectually 
virtuous according to the model. In this way, the model is also capable of making sense of 
some familiar and forceful intuitions about epistemic luck.14 
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1 For representative samples from virtue ethics, see Adams (2006) and Hurka (2001). For 
representative samples from virtue epistemology, see Roberts and Wood (2007) and Baehr 
(2011).  
2 See Baehr (2011: Ch. 1). The questions and problems central to traditional epistemology 
generally pertain to the nature, limits, and sources of knowledge. For an approach to virtue 
epistemology that is “conservative” rather than autonomous, see Zagzebski (1996).  
3 This model bears resemblances to a four-part model of “thinking dispositions” developed 
by educational psychologist Ron Ritchhart in (2002). Three parts of my model correspond 
fairly closely to three part’s of Ritchhart’s model; in fact, as I get to below, one part of my 
model was directly influenced by empirical work conducted by Ritchhart and some of his 
colleagues at Harvard’s Project Zero. The fourth part of my model is substantially different 
from the fourth part of Ritchhart’s model. 
4 “Virtue reliabilists” focus primarily on the latter sorts of virtues. For reliabilist approaches 
to virtue epistemology, see Sosa (2007) and Greco (2010). It is worth noting that the divide 
between virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism appears to be closing, particularly as 
virtue reliabilists like Sosa (ibid.) are giving greater attention to the role of agency and the 
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will in the cognitive life. See my (2011: Ch. 4) for more on the relationship between virtue 
responsibilist and virtue reliabilism.  
5 For more on the distinction between intellectual virtues and moral virtues, see my (2011: 
Appendix). See also Zagzebski (1996: 137-65).  
6 For instance, what I have elsewhere (2013: 114-115) referred to as “negative” virtues 
(virtues that are manifested in a lack or absence of certain sorts of concerns or actions) may 
lack what I describe below as the judgment and competence dimensions of an intellectual 
virtue.  
7 Later I will address the sense in which intellectual virtues must be “rooted” in a love of 
epistemic goods. For more on the precise nature of the orientation in question, see my 
(Baehr 2011: Ch. 6).   
8 This is not to suggest than an especially deep or sharp distinction can be drawn between 
the two sets of traits. See note 3 above for references on this topic.  
9 Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure and intemperance in Book VII brings to mind the 
possibility of epistemic intemperance or self-indulgence. A person who, say, takes too much 
pleasure in marking extremely fine but inconsequential distinctions or who delights in the 
accumulation of trivial knowledge or celebrity gossip may be guilty of this vice. This is a 
reminder of the fact pleasure in certain epistemic goods or apparent goods can be 
indicative of intellectual vice. See Battaly (2010) for more on this and related topics.  
10 Some such questions, underscored by the foregoing discussion, include: How exactly 
should a “love” of epistemic goods be understood? Must it be an intrinsic love of such goods 
or love of them for their own sake? How, more precisely, is the motivational component of 
an intellectual virtue related to the affective component? Is it really plausible to think that 
all (or at least most) intellectual virtues involve a unique cognitive competence? How 
reliable are these competences likely to be in ordinary (non-demon) worlds? How should 
we understand the epistemic status of the beliefs and related elements of the judgment 
dimension of intellectual virtues? Must these justified? Must they amount to knowledge?   
11 See e.g. Zagezebski (1996: 177-84). 
12 Defenders of a reliability requirement sometimes seem to equivocate between the two 
sorts of requirements just noted. Zagzebski, for instance, says: “[W]e do not call a person 
virtuous who is not reliably successful herself … So if she is truly open-minded, she must 
actually be receptive to new ideas, examining them in an evenhanded way and not ruling 
them out because they are not her own; merely being motivated to act in these ways is not 
sufficient” (1996: 177). Elsewhere (e.g. 184-94), her focus is clearly on reliability 
understood as truth-conduciveness.   
13 Some might argue that unqualified competence-possession requires a stronger kind of 
reliability, namely, that the person reliably achieve the final end or goal of the competence 
in the world she inhabits. On this view, the demon, owing to bad environmental luck, fails to 
possess the relevant competences. On the view assumed here, by contrast, competence-
possession can, to an extent, be separated from considerations of environmental luck. 
Again, while I am content with saying that the demon victim possesses a competence only 
if, under favorable environmental conditions, he would reliably form true beliefs, I deny 
that he must be in such conditions in order to possess the competence. In the end I do not 
think much hangs on the difference between these two conceptions of a competence. If the 
more restrictive conception were correct, my claim would simply be that one central 
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dimension of an intellectual virtue is the possession of something like a conditional or 
qualified competence.  
14 I am grateful to audiences at an APA symposium on virtue epistemology and virtue ethics 
in the spring of 2013, a conference on the same topic at Soochow University in the summer 
of 2014, and a colloquium at the University of Edinburgh in the summer of 2014 for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. A special thanks to Anne Baril and Allan Hazlett 
for some extended discussions of several relevant issues.  
